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The unspoken side of mutual adjustment: Understanding intersubjective negotiation 
in small professional service firms 
Abstract 
Employment relationships and practices in small firms are generally acknowledged to 
be ad hoc, contested and negotiated, producing ‘mutual adjustment’ between owner-
managers and employees. Drawing on detailed qualitative empirical material from 
three small professional service firms, we argue that the explicit instances of formal or 
informal negotiation that influence mutual adjustment cannot be understood as 
discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday intersubjective negotiations. 
Mutual adjustment is founded in a largely unspoken, intersubjective guessing game 
that becomes particularly crucial in the ambiguity-intensive nature of small 
professional service firms where organizational realities are particularly prone to 
idiosyncratic (mis)interpretation. The intersubjective guesswork underlying mutual 
adjustment is potentially dysfunctional as outcomes arise that satisfy neither owner-
manager nor employee interests. We suggest that understanding employment 
relationships in small professional service firms requires greater focus on the study of 
individuals’ perceptions and the ways in which their relative positions are structured in 
intersubjective mutual (mis)recognition. 
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Introduction 
Analysis of employment relationships in small firms has advanced beyond crude 
polarizations of ‘small is beautiful’ or ‘bleak house’ perspectives (Ram and Edwards, 
2003) to recognize that relations between owner-managers and employees are the 
product of ongoing negotiations and processes of mutual adjustment (Holliday, 1995; 
Moule, 1998; Ram, 1994, 1999a). Mutual adjustment refers to the ways in which both 
owner-managers and their employees accommodate, adapt to and, potentially, 
struggle with one another to develop working practices and employment relationships. 
Importantly, this acknowledges that employees are not ‘passive recipients of 
management control’ (Ram and Edwards, 2003: 722) but are involved in ongoing 
processes of (re)negotiation and adaptation. Small professional service firms (sPSFs) 
provide a valuable focus for this debate because of the high degrees of 
interdependency between dominant owner-managers and valuable specialist 
employees (Messersmith and Wales, 2011; Tam et al., 2002) that can potentially lead to 
greater degrees of mutual adjustment in their employment relationships (Ram, 1999a). 
However, the concept of mutual adjustment remains relatively underdeveloped in this 
context.  
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While studies of small firms have distinguished between and examined the formal and 
informal nature of negotiation shaping employment relationships and working 
practices (Marlow et al., 2010) there has been limited exploration of the processes that 
may underlie (and potentially undermine) this negotiation. Utilizing detailed qualitative 
empirical material from three sPSFs, this paper develops the concept of mutual 
adjustment to help understand ‘the often opaque and complex internal dynamics’ 
(Ram and Edwards, 2003: 727) of small firms’ employment relationships. Our findings 
suggest that explicit instances of formal or informal negotiation cannot be understood 
as discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday, intersubjective forms of 
negotiation. These negotiations have important consequences for the organization as 
their development can become potentially dysfunctional and outcomes arise that 
satisfy neither owner-manager nor employee interests. 
Literature Review 
Employment relationships in small firms 
Regarded as informal adhocracies (Mintzberg, 1980), small firms are often considered 
to be dominated by the interests and goals of owner-managers. The same close 
physical proximity and interpersonal contact that breeds informality (Bacon and Hoque, 
2005; Ram and Edwards, 2003) can also increase opportunities for owner-managers to 
exert their influence (Jennings and Beaver, 1997). These close social-working 
 
 
5 
 
relationships allow some scope for employer and employee needs to be 
accommodated, for example employees may be granted flexibility around working-
hours in return for effort or task flexibility (Nadin and Cassell, 2007; Tsai et al., 2007), 
creating ongoing, everyday processes of negotiation. 
Traditional polarizations of ‘small is beautiful’ or ‘bleak house’ approaches to small 
firms (Ram and Edwards, 2003) have been criticized for failing to pay sufficient 
attention to the way employment relationships might feature a combination of 
conjunctive and disjunctive interests (Marlow and Patton, 2002). This reflects a need 
for a more balanced, context-sensitive understanding of the nuances of employment 
relationships in small firms (Blackburn, 2005; Harney and Dundon, 2006). While 
external influences and sectoral factors interact with the internal firm environment to 
shape and potentially constrain employment relationships (Barrett, 1999; Barrett and 
Rainnie, 2002; Rainnie, 1989), they are not deterministic (Jansen et al., 2011). Those 
inside the organization must make sense of these factors and neither owner-managers 
nor their employees are passive in this interpretation (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; Gilman 
and Edwards, 2008; Ram, 1994). It is this negotiation of employment relationships 
within the firm that is the focus of the present study. 
The role of mutual adjustment 
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Laying emphasis on informal communication between actors, Mintzberg (1980) 
proposed ‘mutual adjustment’ as a reflection of the control of working practices by the 
‘doers’. Workers in small firms are not powerless in the face of management interests 
(Ram and Edwards, 2003) but may draw on various resources to actively ‘bargain’ with 
their employers. Employment relationships and working practices in small firms are 
significantly influenced by such bargaining, of give and take between managers and 
employees. These ongoing, everyday interactions produce forms of mutual 
accommodation, adaptation and struggle (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 1994) and, as order is 
negotiated in an informal environment characterized by close spatial and social 
proximity, this is unlikely to derive solely from formalized management strategies 
(Nadin and Cassell, 2007; Ram, 1994; Verreynne et al., 2011). Mutual adjustment 
therefore suggests a more nuanced understanding of the informally negotiated 
working relationship of everyday organizational life (Ram, 1999b).  
Classic ethnographic studies of SMEs have highlighted the significance of this internal 
negotiation of social relations and the prominence of informality (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 
1994). Working practices and employment relationships in small firms are complex and 
heterogeneous (Rainnie, 1991) involving improvised, ad hoc solutions and 
compromises, producing particular, unwritten practices, routines and tacit 
understandings (Brown, et al., 2010; Ram et al., 2001). These processes of informal 
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negotiation produce forms of mutual adjustment (Goffee and Scase, 1995; Ram, 1999a) 
that we suggest can be particularly heightened in sPSFs. 
The distinctive case of small PSFs 
We suggest that sPSFs represent a potentially fruitful avenue for investigating forms of 
employer-employee negotiation. Whilst retaining many of the features of small firms, 
for example around close physical and social proximity and informality, sPSFs also 
exhibit many of the distinct features associated with larger PSFs. For example, the 
influential position of highly-skilled or specialist employees who work closely with 
clients can be central to the success of these organizations, granting them a relatively 
strong position from which to negotiate their employment relationships and exert 
influence on the development and growth of the firm (Behrends, 2007; Ram, 1999a, 
1999b). Employment relationships in sPSFs are therefore characterized by ‘the 
necessity of balancing the pressures for organizational efficiency with the need to 
harness the entrepreneurial facilities of key staff [which] tends towards more 
contingent and fluid approaches to labour’ (Ram, 1999a: 28).  
Employment practices can be used to moderate these relationships (Boxall and 
Steeneveld, 1999; Tam et al., 2002) and more sophisticated practices have been 
identified in specialist small firms than in other SMEs (Brown et al., 2010; Dietz et al., 
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2006). However, with room for worker discretion and a potential lack of managerial 
expertise, there remains a need for consent to be negotiated (Ram, 1994, 1999b). The 
negotiation of employment relationships and working practices in sPSFs is therefore 
characterized by the interdependence and potential conflict between central owner-
managers and valuable, influential specialist workers. It is this ongoing, everyday 
negotiation that produces potentially distinctive forms of mutual adjustment. However, 
the development of working practices and employment relationships in sPSFs and 
other small, knowledge-intensive organizations remain relatively under-researched, 
despite their importance for many economies (Ram and Edwards, 2010). 
Mutual adjustment and intersubjectivity 
In the small firm context, the importance of mutual adjustment is developed from a 
perspective on the negotiated order that reflects the relative importance of factors 
such as external environment and individual characteristics as well as both formal and 
informal negotiations (Ram, 1994: 5). We suggest that there is a further, internally held 
influence of individual (mis)perceptions that underlies (and potentially undermines) 
this negotiated order and the mutual adjustment that reflects it. Recent discussions of 
employment relationships in small firms have focused on forms of informality but not 
on the unspoken influences that determine forms of accommodation and adaptation. 
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We suggest the relevance of intersubjectivity as a useful conception for informal, 
(partially) unacknowledged forms of negotiation in small firms. 
Intersubjectivity is derived from the particularly interactional infrastructure of 
organizations in which individuals seek to understand others, to make themselves 
understood and to hold one another accountable for these understandings (Reich, 
2010). It has therefore been suggested as useful for understanding organizational life 
(Eden et al., 1981) and management, as a mediating influence in these processes of 
mutual understanding and interpretation (Hancock and Tyler, 2001). It is in asserting a 
perception of others that one takes up a position and an identity of one’s own and 
intersubjectivity therefore provides a means of understanding how individuals 
(differently) construe power and predict the behaviour of powerful others, their values 
and intentions (Jones, 1984). It is in this unchoreographed dance of interpretation and 
prediction that norms can develop in work groups (Eden et al., 1981) and that non-
vocal coordination of organizational environments and practices can take place 
(Schegloff, 1992). We propose that this type of mutual recognition is an important 
factor underlying the processes of mutual adjustment in small firms. 
In particular, while studies of small firms have examined the informal nature of 
negotiation shaping employment relationships (Holliday, 1995) there has been limited 
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attention given to illuminating other ways in which employment relationships and 
working practices might develop. The potential role of intersubjectivity in these distinct 
contexts has yet to be explored. However, the reliance of owner-managers on their 
personal assessments (Nooteboom, 1988), discussions of tacit understanding and 
knowledge management (Edwards, 2007; Edwards et al., 2007; Yu, 2009) and the role 
of individual subjectivity in relational development (Jayasinghe et al., 2008) have 
suggested something of the idea’s relevance. Intersubjectivity has also allowed Sharifi 
and Zhang (2009) to draw out the relative unimportance of truth in the negotiation of 
organizational definitions, broadly in line with considerations of SMEs as shared 
communities of meaning (Rigg, 2005). 
Our paper sets out to explore the ways in which ongoing, everyday negotiations may 
manifest in sPSFs with a view to developing our understanding of the processes 
underlying mutual adjustment. We will discuss our research findings in terms of the 
potential tensions between central, dominant owner-managers and influential 
specialist workers and how the processes underlying mutual adjustment cope with and 
accommodate these tensions on an everyday basis. Intersubjective negotiation is then 
discussed in relation to mutual adjustment and its impact in sPSFs. We will first 
describe the method we adopted for our exploratory research.  
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Method 
Our study was focused on investigating working practices and employment 
relationships in sPSFs. Our qualitative multiple case-study research strategy (Yin, 2003) 
enabled us to explore the relatively informal yet routine-based environments of SMEs 
(Scott et al., 1989) and understand employment practices and relationships in action. 
Getting close to the practice of employment relationships in SMEs reveals subtleties of 
employment relationships (Holliday, 1995; Ram, 1994) and in our study we became 
interested in the processes underlying mutual adjustment. 
Three sPSFs were recruited as separate cases via purposive sampling. The firms, with 
fewer than 50 employees, were small (BERR, 2006) and corresponded to Morris and 
Empson’s (1998: 610) definition of PSFs as organizations trading on the ability of their 
human capital to create bespoke, intangible solutions to complex client problems. 
Despite each firm possessing relatively sophisticated formal policies, for example 
evidenced by their attainment of such external recognition as Investors in People 
accreditation, elements of their practices were conducted informally (Marlow et al., 
2010), not least owing to the intangible nature of the service work undertaken.  
The organizations provided specialist recruitment (‘SciRec’, a scientific industry 
recruitment firm and ‘FinRec’, a financial services recruitment firm) and design-
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communications (‘ComCo’, a communications consultancy) services. All three firms 
operated as niche service providers to small numbers of clients and identified 
themselves as offering bespoke, specialist services that could be clearly distinguished 
from more common ‘high-street’ providers. Typically all had low turnover rates, 
reflecting owner-managers’ conception of the valued, highly skilled nature of their 
employees. As well as the centrality of specialist work, the three firms had sufficient 
commonalities, such as owner-managers who had left large corporate environments to 
pursue similar work through their own businesses and a reliance on narrow client 
bases, to allow meaningful comparisons to be drawn between their employment 
relationships and working practices despite their different sectors. The firms were 
given pseudonyms to anonymize their identity. 
Gathering empirical material 
Detailed qualitative research was conducted in each company over an 18-month period 
by the paper’s first author. This comprised an initial on-site phase (phase one) at the 
company premises followed by telephone, email and some personal contact during an 
intervening period before a second significant phase on-site (phase two). In total the 
empirical material comprised on-site observations (348 hours), semi-structured 
interviews (x35) and company documentation (600 pages; see Appendix Table 1). The 
three sources of empirical material facilitated triangulation and built understanding to 
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inform the ongoing study (Denzin, 1970; Webb, 1970). Further, observations helped to 
gain a sense of the day-to-day practices in each firm and attending team meetings, 
coffee breaks and other events provided a sense of context while developing rapport 
between researcher and participants (Alvesson, 2011a). This informal interaction was 
supported by access to a broad range of documents such as employment contracts, 
values statements, general staff emails and other notices. 
Care was taken to interview people across each firm to gain a rounded understanding 
of working lives. The semi-structured interviews typically lasted around 60 minutes, 
with a range between 35 and 105 minutes, often depending on the participants’ 
individual approaches to the process. All interviews were structured around topics 
including recruitment and selection, training, reward and recognition, performance 
appraisal and staff exit. These initial questions then allowed participants to relate their 
own explanations of employment relationships and working practices, descriptions that 
were subsequently pursued by the interviewer. Verbatim interview transcripts were 
produced in their entirety for phase one and for relevant sections in phase two to 
facilitate subsequent analysis (e.g. excluding introductory chat and unrelated 
digressions). 
Analysis 
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Drawing too-sharp a distinction between collection and analysis of qualitative empirical 
material can hinder the depth of a research study by closing-off lines of enquiry arising 
from emerging ideas and reflections (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In 
light of this, interview tapes were listened to within 24 hours of the recording for points 
of interest or that required elaboration. Subsequent, close readings of the empirical 
material, conducted by both authors, informed ongoing discussions to develop a rich 
understanding of the organizations.  
Initial reviews of the empirical material collected suggested that employment 
relationships comprised negotiations on many topics and in different modes. We 
organized our empirical material by coding instances in which one party’s interests 
were (or were perceived by them to be) in negotiation or tension with another party’s. 
We ordered these according to the area of employment relationship in which it 
occurred, for example ‘salary setting and review’. For each instance, we noted the 
positions of the relevant parties and briefly described how the matter was resolved. 
Further, we were careful to draw on the longitudinal nature of our study and trace 
changing perceptions of negotiation around issues such as payment structures that 
persisted throughout the study. Given the emergent nature of our codes, no formal 
testing was completed for agreement between the authors but a coding dictionary was 
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developed and discussed, disagreements being resolved by recourse to the empirical 
material. 
The codes and relevant extracts of empirical material were analysed in light of existing 
literature on employment relationships and working practices in small firms and the 
nature of influence exerted by specialist employees, requiring frequent returns to the 
original empirical material as we explored the concepts developed. The negotiations 
identified were observed to take very different forms. Some issues were resolved 
through a formal negotiation such as using a pay review meeting to discuss an 
employee’s salary level while other issues were addressed through informal 
negotiations, such as reminding staff of appropriate conduct towards colleagues in the 
office. These formal and informal explicit negotiations fitted with our existing 
understandings of mutual adjustment but there were other instances that departed 
from established literature. These were occasions in which research participants 
described changes being made in response to perceived, but as yet unrealised, 
pressures within the organization. In other words, while there was no apparent explicit 
negotiation, parties were altering their position in respect of another as if engaged in 
an active negotiation. As these instances emerged from our findings, we were 
prompted to consider how these unspoken ‘negotiations’ informed the employment 
relationships in our participant firms.  
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Findings 
In this section we will describe the dynamics of the mutual adjustment of employment 
relationships and working practices in each firm and discuss specific examples in detail. 
This is principally to suggest the unspoken, anticipatory processes underlying mutual 
adjustment that are not adequately accounted for or addressed in the existing 
literature. Our findings are presented on a firm-by-firm basis to allow for a detailed 
description of the context and (potential) relationships between different areas of 
negotiation, acknowledging that types of negotiation, for example in terms of relative 
degrees of informality, are not mutually exclusive (Marlow, et al., 2010). 
All three firms sought to grow and increase the degree of formality in their 
employment relationships and business processes (Gilman and Edwards, 2008). 
Existing employment relationships, contrary to observations in larger PSFs, had 
features in common with adhocratic, informal small firms governed by powerful, 
central owner-managers. However, the characterization of specialist workers as 
important to the organizations was also common to all three firms. 
ComCo 
ComCo Limited is a broad-based communications consultancy offering public relations 
(PR), strategic marketing, design and internal communications services. ComCo was 
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incorporated in 2001, almost four years prior to the first research visit. The three 
founding directors, Patrick, Roger and Steve, had previously worked at the same large 
company and were later joined by Eddie, one of Roger’s former colleagues, who 
became a junior director alongside Steve. Including the hands-on directors, the 
business employs 14 people, divided between PR/communications professionals (x6), 
the growing design team (x5) and a small sales team (x3). Although initially focused on 
providing these services to SMEs and public sector organizations, as part of its growth 
strategy ComCo later attracted more lucrative and demanding private-sector clients. 
The business also changed in other ways during the study, including Patrick’s exit and 
Roger taking a majority stake, increasing his already significant influence across the 
firm. 
The nature of mutual adjustment at ComCo combined formal, informal and ‘unspoken’ 
forms of negotiation as well as resistance. A central force in the everyday working 
relations is derived from Roger informally asserting control, not only on the employees 
but also his fellow directors. He is the centre of the office (and the organization) with 
most PR work going through him. When out of the office Roger maintains his centrality, 
making regular calls throughout the day for short briefings and follow-ups.  
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Accommodation and adaptation in practices is illustrated in the case of consultants’ 
pay. When Laura joined ComCo she was paid what Patrick admitted was a ‘very low’ 
wage but with a contractual promise to review the amount after three and six months. 
Laura reported that the company had honoured these formal pay reviews. However, 
while Patrick fretted about her starting salary, Laura explained, independently, how she 
was happy with her initial rate of pay since she had offered to work for free in order to 
make her first step on the ladder. The formal pay reviews were held, thereafter, on an 
annual basis but the directors also awarded ad hoc bonuses for exceptional client work. 
This reflected Patrick’s concern that ComCo pay competitive salaries to retain key staff, 
who were seen as having vital client relationships that would be difficult to replace: 
We want to keep people because it’s such a relationship-based business. If you 
were to lose them you are in danger of losing the client because the client likes 
to see that person. 
As with Laura, this led to staff receiving pay increases and promotions outside of the 
formal pay review process. These increases were not only informal, they were neither 
sought nor initially anticipated by the staff. Laura, after developing a burgeoning local 
reputation for her work, related her experience: 
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We had the team meeting in January and we were going through all the 
accounts and all the Private Sector ones [had] my name on them, and I think I 
must have looked, been a bit freaked out! Patrick took me outside and said, 
“Oh, you know, we were going to give you a pay rise” and officially… and then 
gave me a letter and it was all in, in there, it had been decided. 
However, this strategy was acknowledged to increase pressure on the business to 
generate profit in order to afford the salaries. Whilst the perceived consequences of 
losing skilled staff left the owners feeling that they had had little choice, concerns over 
affordability remained and Patrick feared that ComCo could lose staff as a result of 
limited pay increases in the future, despite no evidence that staff considered leaving or 
required higher salaries. The importance of established relationships and the bespoke 
nature of the work left the owner-managers unable to identify how to recruit or 
replace such staff. 
This deep belief in the value of their most effective staff members left the owner-
managers feeling constrained in some of the areas of the business, extending beyond 
pay and rewards. This was most dramatically demonstrated when, while working at a 
client’s offices, two senior specialists contravened the client’s email policy, causing 
great embarrassment for ComCo’s directors who were well-known in that sector. Under 
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ComCo’s disciplinary policy Alison and Christina could have been dismissed, something 
Roger was initially determined to do, as much to restore his reputation with the clients 
as to signal that such behaviour in ComCo was unacceptable.  
However, Roger and Patrick also recognized that ComCo must still deliver the client 
contract and that Alison and Christina were central to this. Neither Alison nor Christina 
campaigned to keep their jobs, yet the owner-managers felt compelled to acquiesce to 
their unspoken interests for fear of jeopardising the project and future work in this 
important sector. Although the option of dismissal was discussed between the owner-
managers, no formal or informal direct negotiation took place and the matter was 
quietly dropped. It seemed as though the owner-managers’ perception of specialist 
employees’ value ensured that their interests were represented in management 
discussions, in this case superseding company policy and the owner-managers’ 
immediate personal interests. 
SciRec 
SciRec Limited specializes in recruiting staff for scientific industries, providing 
associated services such as psychometric testing and interview training. The managing 
director, Alex, had taken voluntary redundancy from his senior recruitment role at a 
major pharmaceutical company and founded the firm in early 2001, three years before 
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the first research visit. He is the sole owner. SciRec serves a small number of clients 
across Britain on a contractual basis rather than replicating the more highly sales-
driven form of ‘high-street’ recruitment agencies. Services are based around a detailed 
understanding of clients’ businesses and strong relationships with the departmental 
managers for whom the services are tailored by SciRec’s consultants. There were two 
consultants at the start of the study and three at its conclusion. 
Managing director Alex’s relations with staff were characterized by his dissatisfaction 
and continual attempts to cajole consultants into line. Such frustrations were tempered 
by his nervousness around staff turnover. The extent of consultants’ power stems from 
the company’s reliance not only on their abilities to assess applicants’ technical skill 
and suitability for a given role, but also upon the relationships they develop with 
managers at client firms. In common with the other participant firms, employees with 
high levels of performance were seen as particularly difficult to recruit, irrespective of 
qualifications or experience. This led Alex to offer these top performers additional 
benefits such as externally-provided training courses in order to pre-empt any intention 
to leave, despite no such intentions being indicated. 
Consultants’ boundary-testing appeared a common feature of mutual adjustment at 
SciRec and this gradual, contested adaptation could continue over long periods of time. 
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During the first research phase there was an intricate combination of contingent pay 
arrangements. Alex described these schemes as a reward and an incentive for filling 
client vacancies that earned revenue for the firm. However, the consultants perceived 
inequity in the system because, under its complex rules, certain vacancies attracted 
commission while other, similar ones did not. As Kathy, a consultant, explained: 
I’m not supposed to claim for that [type of vacancy], but I think people claim for 
it anyway? (Researcher: People being?) Erm, me and [colleague] (laugh). 
Because, you know, we [SciRec] make less of a fee on people coming through 
the [client] website but our argument is that we do exactly the same for those 
candidates as we do for others... 
In this way, the consultants were attempting to extend the scope of their financial 
rewards. Alex appeared complicit in this ‘cheating’ by signing off these commission 
claims while company performance was on target, effectively accepting their implicit 
demands for increased remuneration. In doing so, Alex undermined his own carefully 
prepared commission system that had been developed to reward and focus those 
activities he deemed most important to SciRec’s long-term success. The consultants 
adjusted accordingly, assessing their commission rates (and related work) in terms of 
what Alex was willing to sign-off rather than the formal policy. This mutually adjusted 
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practice therefore came about through an unacknowledged process of negotiation in 
which the consultants submitted adjusted claims and gradually established what would 
and would not be accepted. 
Concerned at the company’s declining performance against client service level 
agreements, yet still paying out commission for placements, Alex again became 
frustrated with his employees. He eventually opted to completely overhaul the 
commission scheme. Working over the Christmas holiday, with only limited input from 
Sharon (operations manager), Alex redesigned the scheme explicitly in line with his 
current goals. The changes increased emphasis on client satisfaction and, while winning 
new business would attract a higher rate of commission, filling vacancies at existing 
clients (‘shooting fish in a barrel’ – Sharon) would attract reduced rates. Acting in this 
unilateral fashion, Alex operated as a dominant owner-manager, exercising his 
apparent right to run his business as he saw fit. There was neither engagement with 
staff nor explicit acknowledgement of the ways in which the system had previously 
adapted, and what employee beliefs and goals these adaptations had reflected. 
The consultants learned of the change at a meeting called to announce its 
implementation. As Sharon recalled, initial reactions were not positive: 
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Well, Kathy cried. (INT: Cried?) Yes, she actually excused herself [from the 
meeting] and cried in the office. Erm, Lucy got mad...anyway, she was off sick all 
the time. 
Although the changes might reduce consultants’ earnings, performance-related 
rewards were provided for the results Alex required. However, the consultants focused 
on those changes that they argued would cost them hundreds of pounds each month 
in lost commission. Three weeks after the announcement Alex described the 
atmosphere as ‘a bit frosty the snowman’ and, within a couple of months, his changes 
had been quietly dropped. In redesigning the pay system Alex failed to acknowledge 
the potential power held by the consultants at the heart of his business. By assuming 
that, as owner, he had prerogative to unilaterally set pay and commission rates while 
not accounting for consultants’ interests, Alex effectively required the consultants to 
explicitly assert themselves in resisting the changes.  
The previous system that had gradually been adapted through an implicit process of 
mutual adjustment was therefore reinstated after a prolonged campaign of informal, 
small scale resistance from the consultants. However, when the resistant consultants 
eventually left the firm through unrelated causes, Alex found that, contrary to his 
previous fears, replacing them was relatively easy and caused minimal disruption with 
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the firm’s major client. He therefore felt confident in reintroducing the reward scheme 
he had previously been forced to abandon. New employees, seeking to impress Alex 
and not having implicitly negotiated unacknowledged increases in their commission 
claims, expressed little resistance and accepted the scheme without incident. 
FinRec 
FinRec Limited specializes in the recruitment of permanent staff to the largest 
operators in the financial services and consumer credit industry. It was founded in 1994 
by owner-manager Paul who had worked in retail finance and was still involved in this 
industry via a separate business venture. FinRec’s clients have outlets nationwide and 
undertake regular recruitment activities. The precise nature of the service provided 
depends on client requirements but can involve recruiting individuals or hiring an 
entire team. While serving national companies, selection decisions depend upon 
consultants’ understanding of individual managers’ requirements and preferences for 
the successful placement of candidates. To succeed, FinRec’s nine consultants must 
have an appreciation of the job markets local to their client outlet, local rates of pay 
and also the style of the existing team so that candidates complement those staff 
already in post. 
 
 
26 
 
FinRec has a strong emphasis on meeting personal targets, including gentle ‘peer 
pressure’, recording individual progress in meetings and on notice-boards. In addition 
to the formal commission structure there are regular activities in which performance is 
rewarded with alcohol, reinforcing a work hard/play hard culture. The highly 
competitive nature of the firm was suggested by an occasion, now part of FinRec 
folklore, when Norma (the operations manager) had to intervene in a competition over 
bottles of spirits that led to heated rows in the office. 
Reviewing performance and rewards at FinRec, owner-manager Paul and operations 
manager Norma realized that, while team managers were being paid a higher salary to 
manage team performance in addition to their consultant roles, this premium was 
unrelated to their respective teams’ results. They wanted to create a link between 
team performance and team managers’ rewards. In considering how to resolve such a 
sensitive matter, Norma explained their approach: 
Paul will come up with various options, but I will actually then challenge him, 
and I always say “Right, if I was Jane, or if I was Diane, I wouldn’t be happy with 
that because X, Y, and Z”...So we tend to do it between us and then when we 
came up with the one we finally, hopefully is going to work 
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In this instance a decision was made to create an additional team and focus team 
managers’ bonuses more closely on the performance of their team: 
I said, well I think that’s fair, I can’t see why it wouldn’t work. They’re going to 
have smaller teams, we’re not giving them a salary cut, and if somebody said 
the same to me, I’d be laughing me. Same money, less staff, less pressure, I can 
get more bonus if the team do, great! ...there’s a lot of stuff that we talk about 
which doesn’t get filtered down 
Taking on the role of Jane and Diane in the thought process, Paul and Norma granted 
the team managers influence in the discussion, playing-out a negotiation as if they 
were in the room stating their case. By inferring their potential reactions or objections 
to each idea raised, Paul and Norma sought to satisfy Jane and Diane without resort to 
formal discussions or even informal soundings on ideas. It meant that, even before 
Jane and Diane considered new proposals, attempts had been made to pre-emptively 
avoid their objections. Thus, there is an adjustment taking place prior to the 
employees’ awareness of the potential changes. 
The nature of ongoing, everyday mutual adjustment at FinRec can be seen in the 
employees’ attitudes towards targets. Comparisons were made with colleagues and 
targets were decided upon ‘behind’ the official targets, just as individual judgements 
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were made regarding quality, and these idiosyncratic, informal targets were adjusted 
accordingly. As team manager Jane explained: 
If somebody’s sat there and they’re doing eight CVs a week and they’re 
thrashing their [revenue] targets, I’m not going to jump up about 12 CVs. If 
somebody’s done eight CVs, thrashing their target, am I really going to jump up 
and down about it? It, you know, it is a guide...so...announcing 12 CVs [as a 
formal activity target] is what you should be aspiring to but I’d rather see 10 
quality ones rather than 12 naff ones put in [but] Paul would go back to the 
view that, "Well if they can do eight and thrash their targets, why don’t they hit 
12 and do a lot more?" Well, to me it’s...if people are doing eight and exceeding 
their targets...then it’s up to them if they want to push themselves a bit more. 
Owner-manager Paul regularly challenges the team managers on the performance of 
certain consultants but allows scope for team managers to defend their staff with 
reasons not to dismiss them, acting out an ongoing, informal negotiation. Team 
managers then have a mediating role between discussions with Paul concerning the 
implementation of official targets and the negotiation with employees around working 
practices and the enacted, day-to-day ‘shadow targets’. It is within this mediating 
position that further mutual adjustment can be seen to occur on an ambiguous, at 
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times implicit, ongoing basis. While the revenue target is the consultants’ principal 
concern, the correlation between activity and revenue means that both measures 
receive management attention, introducing further complexity to the mutual 
adjustment of targets as guides for working practices. 
Discussion: The role of intersubjective negotiation in mutual adjustment 
Small professional service firms (sPSFs) can be characterized in terms of the degree to 
which they hold tensions between the potentially competing interests of central 
owner-managers and their valuable specialist employees, within a context of close 
physical and social proximity. This environment produces forms of mutual adjustment 
in which policies, practices and relationships are gradually, and idiosyncratically, 
developed over time through ongoing, everyday forms of both formal and informal 
negotiation. However, explicit forms of interaction and negotiation do not represent a 
full picture of mutual adjustment. To fully understand the development of working 
practices and employment relationships, we suggest the relevance of processes of 
intersubjective negotiation that underlie, and potentially undermine, mutual 
adjustment.  
The importance of intersubjectivity in small firms is derived from their particular 
ongoing, everyday interactional employment relationships in which individuals seek to 
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understand others, to make themselves understood and to hold one another 
accountable for these understandings (Reich, 2010). It is in the context of this 
unchoreographed dance of interpretation and prediction (Eden et al., 1981) that 
employment relationships and working practices adjust, adapt and accommodate 
(Schegloff, 1992). In some small firms, the gap between intersubjective perception and 
organizational realities may have limited implications but, given the ambiguity-
intensive nature of professional service work, there is greater scope for mutual 
(mis)recognition. In sPSFs there is pressure both on individual staff and the 
organizations themselves to prove their expertise, creating an environment where 
‘[b]eing perceived as an expert is as crucial as actually being one’ (Alvesson, 2011b: 
1649). This has important implications for the perception of value and the position of 
influence and power within these firms.  
In our cases, employers’ assessments of employee value, for example in terms of the 
difficulties in replacing them, influenced their actions in attempting to keep them at 
least ‘satisficed’ (Friedlander and Pickle, 1968). In assessing value, employers may have 
few objective measures against which to test their perceptions. Waiting until an 
employee leaves to identify the relative difficulties in recruiting replacement staff while 
the business struggles from a shortage of skilled staff is an unattractive option (Ram, 
1999a). Likewise, testing whether clients will take their business elsewhere should a 
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particular employee leave represents a gamble for a business relying on few clients. In 
our study, owner-managers did not acknowledge or seek to address this problem, 
confidently relying instead on their own perception of valuable expertise that had 
developed in their particular sPSF context. 
Of course, the owner-managers remained sensitive to client feedback and the 
relationships employees developed with those clients heavily influenced the 
perception of value. However, little was done to gather detailed feedback or to explore 
the quality of the relationships in any systematic way. It is therefore not only any 
‘objective’ state of external factors that influences the development of employment 
relationships within the firm but the perception of these factors by the relevant actors, 
in negotiation with their intersubjective assumptions of the perceptions of the parties 
they are interacting with. In our firms, the perceived value and substitutability of 
specialist employees was not simply a matter of qualifications or other objective 
measures but related to the ambiguous value attached to the somewhat intangible, 
bespoke nature of the services provided.  
While owner-managers worked in close proximity to their employees, promoting 
familiarity and opportunities for monitoring work and behaviour, the ambiguities 
around the bespoke service work often limited the extent to which these managers 
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could directly involve themselves or assess performance. As a result, several employees 
perceived as invaluable by owner-managers were observed to appear to exert influence 
over their pay and conditions. In this way, these employees could, for example, breach 
existing policies without sanction, even to the potentially longer-term detriment of the 
firm. Frequently, no explicit negotiations over the consequences of such actions were 
engaged in. Instead, negotiations seem to have often developed intersubjectively, for 
example, owner-managers weighing-up their projected alternatives, making 
assumptions about the client or employees’ beliefs and intentions. The results of this 
process would then be interpreted by employees and both parties would adjust, adapt 
and accommodate accordingly. 
However, in responding to their interpretations and predictions, owner-managers were 
observed to offer the minimum concessions they felt sufficient. By satisficing the 
workers’ perceived needs, the traditionally dominant owner-manager may hope to 
remove or reduce the motivation for their employees to act as explicit negotiators. For 
example, at FinRec Paul and Norma modified proposed changes to team managers’ 
income structure in order to make it more acceptable to the team managers and 
thereby avoid conflict with these key employees. The ‘adjustment’ was made on the 
basis of Paul and Norma’s best guess as to what Diane and Jane would accept. This 
intersubjective guessing game is distinct from Paul and Norma simply considering the 
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effects of management decisions on staff because their consideration was motivated by 
securing management interests through avoiding dispute rather than concern with 
Jane and Diane’s opinions per sé. 
We suggest that such strategies may be particularly prominent in small firms. Where 
employment relationships are conducted in close physical proximity, explicit 
negotiations may upset familial, interpersonal relationships between interdependent 
owner-managers and employees as the raw power dynamics of the firm are laid bare 
(Goss, 1991; Ram, 1999a, 1999b), no longer obscured by the informality and 
friendliness of day-to-day collaboration (Scott et al., 1989). Further, in small PSFs 
explicitness may create greater pressure to justify ambiguity-intensive skills or outputs 
and interdependency in the employment relationship may blur the balance of power 
within the firm, leaving neither party certain of their position relative to the other. In 
such circumstances, success in an explicit negotiation may secure your interests and 
affirm your position as having power but at the expense of pleasant working relations 
and adaptive cooperation. Failure in such a negotiation, your relative weakness 
explicitly revealed, could lead to a rout in which your interests become largely 
discounted. 
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The negotiation that takes place between owner-managers and employees is therefore 
informed by their ongoing intersubjective guessing games rather than by explicit 
engagement alone. In our participant firms this led to an ad hoc, unspoken mutual 
adjustment and adaptation of working practices and employment relationships. In the 
absence of explicit negotiations, recognized by all parties where ‘stakes’ can be 
discussed until a mutually acceptable value is reached, the significance attached to 
various actions or comments relies heavily on mutual (mis)interpretation and 
(mis)recognition. Uncertain as to what might satisfy employees (Nadin and Cassell, 
2007), owner-managers guess, conceding something to them in the hope that they will 
at least be satisficed. While employees may therefore obtain certain concessions from 
the owner-manager, the absence of explicit negotiation means that employees may not 
recognize such concessions as benefits; the owner-manager’s concession may not 
therefore influence their attitudes or practices. Neither owner-manager nor employees 
see their interests as being served, however the concessional alteration may continue 
to operate. 
Any gains that are made by employees through intersubjective negotiation are informal 
and without guarantee, even if accepted as custom and practice in the firm. However, 
such informality does not preclude individuals being held accountable to the mutual 
(mis)recognition that surrounds such adaptation or adjustment. Implicit rules and 
 
 
35 
 
understandings (Brown et al., 2010) and unspoken expectations (Nadin and Cassell, 
2007) are an outcome of this intersubjectively engaged mutual adjustment process. 
This was most clearly played-out in the present study in terms of the ‘shadow’ 
commission rates at SciRec and ‘shadow’ targets at FinRec. In both cases, particular 
expectations that were not formally or even explicitly agreed upon but developed from 
a series of assumptions and unacknowledged adaptations, undermining the formal 
policies that were in place. Thus, intersubjective negotiation arrived at provisional 
‘shadow agreements’ that had crucial implications for performance within these firms. 
As processes of mutual adjustment, these intersubjectively negotiated guessing games 
and shadow agreements can encounter elements of dysfunction that influence the 
organization’s development. Adaptations made on the basis of guesswork may require 
company resources but still be unnecessary and unsuccessful, potentially creating 
frustrations in the employment relationship and increasing pressure on the 
organization. This matters to informal, adhocractic environments such as those in sPSFs 
because there may be few formal mechanisms effectively setting out a basis for 
decisions or more explicit, formal negotiations. Furthermore, with owner-managers in 
close proximity to employees the environment lends itself to regular, ongoing, informal 
adaptation. An intersubjective guessing game around the nature of power and 
alternatives within the organization can lead employees and employers to seek to 
 
 
36 
 
become more likeable, more in-tune with what is perceived to be required to maintain 
one’s competitive advantage. Intersubjectivity can therefore form the basis of a mutual 
adjustment that frequently reacts or (re)negotiates, coming to underlie, and potentially 
undermine, more explicit forms of negotiation around the employment relationship. 
Currently, research into small firms, and sPSFs, is primarily concerned with explicit 
actors whose interests, the pursuit of those interests and the negotiation required for 
their achievement, can be identified (Nadin and Cassell, 2007; Ram and Edwards, 2003: 
722). We argue that explicit instances of (in)formal negotiation cannot be understood 
as discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday intersubjective negotiations. 
The mutually adjusting nature of employment relationships and working practices 
emerges as a result of this intersubjective negotiation as parties seek to secure their 
interests without recourse to potentially problematic explicit negotiation. These 
negotiations have important consequences for the organization as they give rise to 
potentially dysfunctional outcomes that satisfy neither owner-manager nor employee 
interests. 
Conclusion 
This paper has addressed the under-researched and under-developed concept of 
mutual adjustment in sPSFs. This is partly in response to the need for a more balanced, 
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context-sensitive understanding of the nuances of employment relationships in small 
firms (Blackburn, 2005; Harney and Dundon, 2006). We have argued that the mutual 
adjustment that develops from explicit instances of (in)formal negotiation cannot be 
understood as discrete events disassociated from ongoing, everyday intersubjective 
negotiations. We found that, frequently, there were only very limited explicit 
negotiations over the development of employment relationships or working practices.  
In negotiating, for example, around an employee’s pay, owner-managers would 
frequently base this on the employee’s perceived value and not on any direct 
engagement with that employee. In assessing this value, employers had few objective 
measures available and rarely attempted to find or develop them, confidently relying 
instead on their own perception of valuable expertise. There need not be any ‘real’ 
value conferred by an individual’s skills or place within the organization. We have 
suggested that it is therefore not only any ‘objective’ state of external factors, such as 
the labour market, that influences the development of employment relationships 
within the firm but the perception of an individual or situation by those in negotiation 
with them. In this context, some employees received pay rises or other bonuses 
without seeking or expecting them. Mutual adjustment can therefore become founded 
on a largely unspoken, intersubjective guessing game. 
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We suggest that this may be particularly prominent in small firms, and ambiguity-
intensive sPSFs, where employment relationships are conducted in close physical 
proximity and explicit negotiations may expose the raw power dynamics of the firm, no 
longer obscured by the informality and friendliness of day-to-day collaboration. 
Explicitness may also create greater pressure to justify ambiguity-intensive skills or 
outputs and interdependency in the employment relationship may blur the balance of 
power within the firm, leaving neither party certain of their position relative to the 
other. In the absence of explicit negotiations, recognized by all parties where ‘stakes’ 
can be discussed until a mutually acceptable value is reached, the significance attached 
to various actions or comments relies heavily on mutual (mis)interpretation and 
(mis)recognition. However, such informal, adhocratic development does not preclude 
individuals being held accountable to the mutual (mis)recognition that surrounds such 
adaptation or adjustment. Implicit rules and understandings and unspoken 
expectations are an outcome of this intersubjectively engaged mutual adjustment 
process. 
These findings have important implications for practitioners because they emphasise 
that everyday actions can be vested with significance and form processes of ongoing 
negotiation regardless of whether they are intended as such. Negotiations around the 
employment relationship are influenced by parties’ intersubjective assessment of their 
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power position relative to others in the organization and therefore their sense of how 
far their interests are satisfied or others’ interests accommodated in everyday actions. 
Potentially dysfunctional or maladaptive ‘shadow agreements’ can therefore develop 
within firms that may undermine explicit policies and practices and become especially 
problematic as firms seek to grow and to introduce greater degrees of formality. By 
viewing mutual adjustment as informed by and informing these intersubjective 
negotiations, parties to an unspoken ‘deal’ might only learn of the bargain through its 
breach, when the aggrieved party explicitly draws attention to what had been ‘agreed’. 
This raises questions for practitioners about how conduct in the workplace is 
interpreted by others and how these factors influence working relationships and 
practices. It means that attempts to explicitly negotiate around an aspect of the 
employment relationship need to be understood in light of any existing implicit 
agreements that may have formed over time. Failing to consider how current practices 
may represent ‘agreements’ to one party risks provoking open and disruptive 
negotiation as that party seeks to explicitly assert its subjectively understood 
assessment of its bargaining power in the organization. 
There are many opportunities for future research, for example investigating how 
processes of mutual adjustment relating to specialists compare to other employees in 
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the same firms. There are interesting questions to consider regarding whether our 
findings could be extended to different types of sPSF as well as other types of SME and 
possibly larger professional organizations, together with comparative cross-cultural 
studies informed by different approaches to employee relationships. One important 
implication of our findings for researchers is the need for sensitivity to intersubjective 
forms of negotiation that may not always be recognized by research participants and 
thus may elude researchers. Explicit incidences of (in)formal negotiations should be 
understood as occurring within a context of everyday, ongoing intersubjective 
negotiation that informs mutual adjustment. We suggest that this requires a shift to 
greater depth in the study of individuals’ perceptions and the ways in which their 
relative positions are structured in intersubjective mutual (mis)recognition. 
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Appendix: Table 1 
Company Sector Activities Employees Data Collection 
Interviews in 
phase one 
Contact in 
intervening period 
Interviews in phase two 
ComCo 
Communications 
firm based in 
Northern England, 
clients nationwide. 
Media / public 
relations, design 
and 
communications 
Focused initially on 
local small businesses 
and local authorities 
across UK. Latterly has 
moved into 
representing 
international clients’ 
UK operations 
alongside local 
authority work, less 
small firms work 
14 in both 
phases plus 
associate staff as 
required (some 
personnel 
changes) 
 
Initial meeting to agree 
access. Observations (93 
hours on-site), semi-
structured interviews, 
reading company 
documentation; informal 
discussions before / after 
normal working day 
5 
(1x owner, 3x 
account 
manager, 1x 
designer) 
Meeting with 
managing director, 
e-mail contact with 
(former) director 
9 
(managing director, 2x 
directors, 3x account 
manager, marketing 
manager, marketing 
assistant, design manager) 
SciRec 
Recruitment firm 
based in Eastern 
England, clients 
nationwide.  
Recruitment Specializing in 
recruitment of staff for 
science industry clients 
6 in both phases 
(although 
personnel had 
changed) 
Initial meeting to agree 
access. Observations 
(142 hours on-site), semi-
structured interviews, 
reading company 
documentation, company 
team meetings, after 
work social activities  
6 
(owner, 2x 
consultants, 
operations 
manager, 2x 
administrators) 
Meeting with 
owner, telephone 
contact with owner, 
e-mail contact with 
operations manager 
and other staff 
members 
6 
(owner, 3x consultants, 
recruitment manager, 
administrator) 
FinRec 
Recruitment firm 
based in Northern 
England, clients 
nationwide.  
Recruitment Specializing in 
recruitment of staff for 
financial services 
industry 
16 (phase one) 
12 (phase two) 
Initial meeting to agree 
access. Observations 
(113 hours on-site), semi-
structured interviews, 
reading company 
documentation, informal 
discussions over lunch 
times and breaks 
8 
(operations 
manager, 2x 
team leaders, 4x 
consultants, 
administration 
supervisor) 
Meeting with 
owner and 
operations 
manager, e-mail 
contact with owner 
1* 
(former team leader) 
*informal conversations 
were held with a variety of 
team members over the 
two week on-site period, 
e.g. lunch breaks and in 
the normal course of work 
